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Two COVID-19 outbreaks occurred in residential buildings with overcrowded housing
conditions in the city of Göttingen in Germany during May and June 2020, when
COVID-19 infection incidences were low across the rest of the country, with a national
incidence of 2.6/100,000 population. The outbreaks increased the local incidence in
the city of Göttingen to 123.5/100,000 in June 2020. Many of the affected residents
were living in precarious conditions and experienced language barriers. The outbreaks
were characterized by high case numbers and attack rates among the residents,
many asymptomatic cases, a comparatively young population, and substantial outbreak
control measures implemented by local authorities. We analyzed national and local
surveillance data, calculated age-, and gender-specific attack rates and performed
whole genome sequencing analysis to describe the outbreak and characteristics of the
infected population. The authorities’ infection control measures included voluntary and
compulsory testing of all residents and mass quarantine. Public health measures, such
as the general closure of schools and a public space as well as the prohibition of team
sports at local level, were also implemented in the district to limit the outbreaks locally.
The outbreaks were under control by the end of June 2020. We describe the measures to
contain the outbreaks, the challenges experienced and lessons learned. We discuss how
public health measures can be planned and implemented through consideration of the
needs and vulnerabilities of affected populations. In order to avoid coercive measures,
barrier-free communication, with language translation when needed, and consideration
of socio-economic circumstances of affected populations are crucial for controlling
infectious disease transmission in an outbreak effectively and in a timely way.
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INTRODUCTION
The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-
CoV-2) is easily transmissible by both symptomatic and
asymptomatic individuals. Closed and densely inhabited
environments favor transmission (1–3).
The first COVID-19 case in the district of Göttingen was
reported on March 11, 2020 (4). The whole district of Göttingen
(city and county district) has a total population of ∼330,000 (of
whom∼120,000 live in the city), and is located in Lower Saxony,
Germany. The district and the rest of Germany first reported an
increase in incidence of COVID-19 during March with a peak in
April—in Göttingen mainly due to outbreaks in care facilities—
followed by a decrease in case numbers by the end of April
2020 (5). In May 2020, the first lockdown was released in whole
Germany, and schools, shops and businesses re-opened and face
masks were not recommended. In this situation, a COVID-19
case cluster was identified in a large residential complex (RC)
in the city of Göttingen (RC1), followed by a second major
outbreak in another RC (RC2) which was located 1 km away
from RC1 but had no connections through residents. This led
to increasing incidences in the whole district, which gained wide
public attention (6–8).
We describe the two outbreaks in the RCs, with a particular
focus on the housing and social conditions of the affected
population and the challenges and measures taken to contain
the outbreaks. We present further recommendations for the
management of outbreaks that occur in buildings with cramped
housing conditions, which often affect marginalized people who
experience precarious living conditions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
An outbreak investigation team from the Robert Koch Institute
(RKI) consisting of two epidemiologists and four containment
scouts supported the local health authorities from June 15–
23, 2020, in implementing measures to understand and contain
the outbreak.
The description of the two outbreaks was based on the
COVID-19 database of the Local Public Health Authority of the
City of Göttingen (LPHA), as of July 03, 2020.
Cases were defined as people who tested positive for SARS-
CoV-2 by PCR betweenMay 16 and June 29, 2020 [corresponding
to calendar weeks (CW) 20–27, 2020], regardless of clinical
symptoms, living in or with epidemiological link to either RC1
or RC2 in this period. The relevant information was gathered
through the LPHA’s investigations and entered in the local
COVID-19 database. We described the COVID-19 cases in the
whole district of Göttingen in two ways:
(a) All cases in the whole district of Göttingen from March 9 to
August 9, 2020 (CW 11–32): by date of reporting, including
cases assigned to the two outbreaks in RCs, based on data
Abbreviations: RC, Residential Complex; RKI, Robert Koch Institute; LPHA,
Local Public Health Authority; CW, calendar week; AR, attack rate; WGS, Whole
genomes sequencing.
from the national surveillance database (RKI SurvNet, as
of 13.08.2020).
(b) Cases assigned to outbreak 1 and 2 by date of testing, derived
from the LPHA’s COVID-19 database, differentiating
between residents and non-residents and including
information on local testing, screening and control
measures in the two residential complexes, at Göttingen
district and city level and at national level, May 16–June 29,
2020 (CW 20–27).
The age and gender distribution, and housing and social
conditions of the residents of RC1 and RC2 were described based
on information provided by the City of Göttingen, as well as
the RKI’s outbreak investigation team’s personal impressions and
their conversations with residents during their visit to the sites.
We compared gender and age distributions between cases
among residents in RC1 and RC2 with the official total resident
population, using the COVID-19 database of the LPHA and
information provided by the City of Göttingen, and calculated
age- and gender-specific attack rates (AR) among resident-cases.
Age, gender, and clinical symptoms were compared between
outbreaks cases and national case numbers (by reporting date)
during the outbreak period (May 16 to June 29, 2020; RKI
SurvNet, as of 03.07.2020).
Whole genomes sequencing (WGS) was performed for 19
cases from the outbreak in RC2. The samples were sequenced on
an Illumina iSeq using the Paragon Genomics CleanPlex SARS-
CoV-2 Panel kit. The panel contains 344 primer with a median
insert size of 96 base pairs (bp). The median sequencing depth
was 100,000 reads per sample with a read length of 2x 125bp.
Sequencing reads were used to reconstruct consensus genomes
using CovPipe v2.0.1 (9). Minimum base quality was 15. Genome
positions with a coverage of at least 20× were used for further
analysis. Sequence similarity was calculated by using a multiple
sequence alignment produced by Pangolin 2.3 (https://github.
com/cov-lineages/pangolin/), which masks positions 0–265 and
29674-end of the sequences in reference coordinates. From the
alignment, genetic distance was computed using a custom R
script, ignoring positions with ambiguous nucleotides.
RESULTS
Between May 16 and June 29, 2020, the LPHA Göttingen
identified 333 cases that were assigned to two outbreaks in
two RCs located in the center of Göttingen. The first cluster
comprised 71 residents in RC1 as well as 124 non-residents
(outbreak 1), and the second cluster comprised 138 residents in
RC2 (outbreak 2). No cases among non-residents were assigned
to outbreak 2 by the LPHA.
RC1 consists of two buildings, one with 15 and another with
17 floors, and each with one staircase and two elevators. In total,
there are 406 apartments, most of which are studios or have
one bedroom (32–54 m2) and some 3–4 room apartments (71–
78 m2). In May 2020, a total of 615 residents were officially
registered; their gender and age distribution are shown in
Tables 1, 2. The heterogeneous residential population consisted
mostly of families and international students. According to the
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TABLE 1 | Gender distribution of SARS-CoV-2 cases and officially registered residents of two residential complexes; gender-specific attack rates, Göttingen, May–June
2020 (COVID-19 database LPHA Göttingen, as of 03.07.2020).
Residential complex 1 Residential complex 2
Cases Residents Attack rate (%) Cases Residents Attack rate (%)
Gender n % n % n % n %
Female 25 35.2 219 35.6 11.4 62 44.9 259 40.3 23.9
Male 46 64.8 396 64.4 11.6 76 55.1 384 59.7 19.8
Total 71 100.0 615 100.0 11.5 138 100.0 643 100.0 21.5
The Totals are in bold values.
TABLE 2 | Age distribution of SARS-CoV-2 cases and officially registered residents of two residential complexes and age-specific attack rates, Göttingen May–June 2020
(COVID-19 database LPHA Göttingen, as of 03.07.2020).
Residential complex 1 Residential complex 2
Age group Cases Residents Attack rate [%] Cases Residents Attack rate [%]
n % n % n % n %
0–5 years 11 15.5 39 6.3 28.2 21 15.2 89 13.8 23.6
6–17 years 15 21.1 41 6.7 36.6 42 30.4 122 19.0 34.4
18–44 years 35 49.3 363 59.0 9.6 56 40.6 290 45.1 19.3
45–64 years 8 11.3 131 21.3 6.1 19 13.8 121 18.8 15.7
65+ years 2 2.8 34 5.5 5.9 0 21 3.3 0
Unknown 0 7 1.1 0 0 0 0
Total 71 100.0 615 100.0 11.5 138 100.0 643 100.0 21.5
The Totals are in bold values.
city authorities, more than half of the residents did not have a
German passport (n = 331; 54%), and more than half received
social benefits.
RC2 is a dilapidated building with 432 apartments (17–39m2),
of which most are studios or have one bedroom; it extends over
up to 12 floors, at that time with one functioning elevator for the
entire building. Residents reported heavy littering of the building
and availability of two washing machines for the residents, one
of which was broken. In April 2020, 643 people were officially
registered in the building, 60% of which were male and one third
children under the age of 18. The gender and age distribution
of residents are shown in Tables 1, 2. A total of 85% of the
residents did not have German citizenship. According to local
authorities, many residents had recently migrated to Germany.
Of all residents in RC2, 90% (n= 578) received social benefits.
Outbreaks 1 and 2 and Measures Taken
OnMay 18, 2020, a resident of RC1 developed clinical symptoms
and tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. He was defined as the
primary case. He did not comply with the isolation order.
Another resident was hospitalized with pneumonia on May 25,
2020, and tested positive on May 26, 2020. Retrospectively,
the LPHA identified three more persons linked to the primary
case who tested SARS-CoV-2 positive on May 16, 17, and 20,
respectively. Testing of 40 contacts of the identified four cases
between May 26 and 29 revealed 38 more cases. Additional
contact tracing of the new cases revealed a total of 364 close
contacts, mostly non-residents of RC1.
Between May 30 and June 02, 2020, all 615 residents of
RC1 were offered voluntary testing in various test centers. Sixty
additional cases (residents and non-residents of RC1) were
identified. Since not all residents attended the testing center,
compulsory testing of the residents was conducted between June
05 and 07 in the garage of the building. Among 420 people tested,
another 24 cases were identified (Figure 3).
Until June 12, 2020, the outbreak included 195 cases in total,
of which 71 were residents of RC1.
On June 12, 2020, two residents from two households of RC2
tested positive for COVID-19 during outpatient consultation at
the hospital. All five household contacts were tested positive.
Thereafter, a screening of all residents was ordered for June 15
and 16, 2020. Among ∼700 tested residents, 120 people tested
positive for SARS-CoV-2. Retesting of negatives revealed 18
further cases, totalling 138 confirmed cases among residents of
RC2 (Figure 3).
Description of Cases by Time
Figure 1 shows the reported COVID-19 cases in the whole
district of Göttingen since the beginning of the epidemic. The
cases assigned to the two outbreaks are highlighted. From May
18 to June 29 (CW 21–27), 58.5% (287/491) of cases in the whole
district were attributed to the RC outbreaks. After an increase in
case number in spring up to the peak of 166 cases in CW 15,
case numbers decreased to 12–16 cases per week (CW 19–21).
Following this, case numbers reached a similarly high level as in
spring due to the outbreaks in RCs. In CW23 and 25, n= 140 and
159 confirmed COVID-19 cases were reported, respectively; 80.0
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FIGURE 1 | Distribution of SARS-CoV-2 cases (N = 1,323) reported to the RKI by reporting date in the calendar weeks 11–33, city and county district of Göttingen,
2020, with assignment of the cases to the outbreak events in residential complexes 1 (blue) and 2 (orange) (n = 287; RKI SurvNet database, 13.08.2020).
and 69.2% of which could be attributed to the outbreak events
(Figure 1).
Gender and Age-Specific Attack Rates
In RC1, 71 of the 615 residents (and 124 non-residents) tested
positive for SARS-CoV-2 (ARRC1 = 11.9%). In RC2, 138 of the
643 officially registered residents tested positive for SARS-CoV-
2 (ARRC2 = 21.5%). No further cases outside the RC2 were
identified. In RC2, the AR among women and men was 23.9 and
19.8%, respectively; in RC1 no gender difference of the AR was
observed (Table 1).
The proportion of cases among children and adolescents
under the age of 18 in RC1 and RC2 was 37 and 46% of all cases,
respectively. In RC1, most cases (49%) occurred in the age group
18–44 years, in RC2 this age group contributed to 40% of cases.
People aged over 45 years accounted for 14% share of cases in
both RCs.
In both RCs, age-specific ARs were highest in children aged 6–
18, followed by children aged 0–5, adults in age-group 18–44. The
lowest ARs were among the oldest age-group (45–64) (Table 2).
Whole Genome Sequencing Analysis of a
Subset of Samples From Outbreak 2
WGS analysis of 19 samples from RC2 cases revealed high
genomic sequence similarity with a maximal genomic distance
between all of the samples between 0 and 3 SNPs (mean 1.1 SNPs)
(Supplementry Figure 2).
There is no evidence of multiple introductions. Phylogenetic
analysis revealed identical virus lineages B.1.159 in all samples.
Despite relatively low overall lineage detection in Germany
in 2020, B.1.159 was detected in only nine other samples in
Germany. The 19 cases were spread over the whole RC2 with
at least one sequenced case per level in one of the four building
parts. The subset contained 11 children between the age of 0 to
15 and eight adults between the ages of 18–60. Based on age
distribution in combination with locations of the flat, it can be
excluded that these 19 cases define a separate subcluster within
the RC2 or within outbreak 2 (Supplementry Figure 1).
Age and Gender Distribution of Outbreak
Cases in Comparison to the National
Average
The overall proportion of women among all outbreak cases
(including non-residents) was 45.6% (152/333), which was below
the national average of 52.5% in the same period. In comparison
to national COVID-19 cases in the same period, the proportion
of outbreak cases was higher among children and adolescents,
especially in outbreak 2. The cases’ mean age was 25 years
(median 23 years) in outbreak 1 and 23 years (median 20 years) in
outbreak 2 compared to 48 years in the national average (median
49 years). Nearly 50% of the cases were aged under 20 years (in
national case numbers this group accounted for <20% in the
same time period). In contrast, the age groups over 40 years and
older were underrepresented in the outbreaks compared to the
nationally reported cases (Figure 2).
Symptoms and Hospitalization
Information on clinical symptoms was available for a total of
150 cases, outbreak 1, in 135/195 (69.2%), and outbreak 2 in
15/138 (10.9%). Frequently cited symptoms among the cases with
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FIGURE 2 | Age distribution of SARS-CoV-2 cases in outbreak 1; n = 195 and outbreak 2; n = 138 (COVID-19 database LPHA Göttingen, as of 03.07.2020), and in
Germany (reporting week 20–27, SARS-CoV-2 cases according to reference case definition (n = 24,411; RKI SurvNet database, as of 03.07.2020).
information on symptoms were fever (44.7%), cough (42.7%),
headache (42.7%), sore throat (28%), and rhinorrhoea (21.3%).
Ageusia and/or anosmia were indicated in 13 cases (8.6%),
pneumonia in four cases (2.6%). Hospitalization was reported for
4.8% of cases [13 cases (6.7%) in RC1; and 3 cases (2.2%) in RC2].
Of the hospitalized cases, three people were treated in intensive
care units (ICU) (2 < 30 years, and >60 years). Two of them had
to be ventilated, and one person died 26 days after diagnosis. The
case fatality during the outbreak in outbreak 1 was 0.5% and 0 in
outbreak 2.
Measures to Contain the Outbreaks
On June 9, 2020, the Göttingen city crisis management team
initiated a daily infection mapping based on a local map
in order to early identify spatial signals of increased case
numbers at crucial settings, such as nursing homes, hostels
for refugees, and hostels for people who sleep rough, and
precarious residential properties. To be able to quickly react to
those signals, 50 medical students and trained staff from the
university hospital (UMG) were available for mass testing and
contact tracing.
Outbreak 1
In outbreak 1, testing of residents and contact persons, initially
performed on a voluntary basis, was later made compulsory.
Individual isolation was ordered for infected people and
quarantine (for 14 days) for all members of households with
newly identified cases. The residents independently organized
the separation of cases, contacts and suspected negative-tested
residents within the RC as well as food supply of quarantined
residents (10). The primary case who did not comply with the
isolation order was placed in a separate apartment. Appropriate
ventilation and physical distancing among residents in the
narrow corridors and elevators of the building were hardly
possible. The city therefore asked the building’s property
management to submit an infection prevention and control
(IPC) plan. It included regular cleaning, distancing, wearing of
masks, and use of elevators by a maximum of two people at any
one time.
Since two contact persons worked in two nursing
homes for elderly people, all residents, and staff
in the nursing homes were tested for SARS-
CoV-2. One resident tested positive, no further
cases occurred.
Thirty-three children who were infected had attended
classes in reduced class sizes in 13 schools and 1 day care
center. The crisis team decided to close all schools and day
care centers in the city and district until June 12, 2020.
Furthermore, all people at an accommodation center for
asylum seekers and an elementary school in the district were
required to be tested. One further case was identified in
the school.
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FIGURE 3 | Distribution of SARS-CoV-2 cases in two residential complexes in Göttingen, May–June 2020 by date of testing and residential status of cases
(COVID-19 database GA Göttingen, as of 03.07.2020) and implementation of control measures at national level, Göttingen county district and city level and in the two
residential complexes, May–June 2020.
Outbreak 2
The two index cases of outbreak 2 were detected during
routine SARS-CoV-2 testing prior to medical procedures in
the UMG, according to the UMG test strategy. Following
the positive test results of all household contacts of both
index cases, immediate compulsory testing of all residents
from RC2 was installed. All residents received face masks
and written information material on COVID-19 in German
and Romanian as, according to the LPHA, the proportion
of Romanian-speaking residents was high (exact figures not
available) (11, 12). The residents were required to attend testing
in front of the building (supported by language mediation).
After testing revealed positive results among 120 people, all
residents in RC2 were quarantined between June 18 and 25,
2020 in order to organize contact tracing and to prevent
transmission outside the building (11). For this purpose, the
building was fenced off and access was monitored by security
staff and police. Residents were informed about the measures
by leaflets and mobile text messages, as well as oral information
with translators.
The property management was required to present an
IPC plan for RC2. Between June 20 and 21, 2020, a
second test was offered to all people who had previously
tested negative, in order for them to leave quarantine
if their second result was negative after June 25, 2020.
During quarantine, residents were supplied with groceries,
meals and sanitary products. Opioid substitution treatment
(OST) was provided to OST patients among residents, a
mobile medical care center including psychiatric care and an
information booth with Romanian language translation. Staff
from community safety, security services and fire department,
various emergency services, a low threshold addiction service,
and the police service were involved in the operation.
Items that were not provided by the public authorities were
provided by local NGOs, such as baby food, diapers and
telephone cards.
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Further measures that were implemented at district level, e.g.,
a requirement to wear a mask on school premises (13), team
sports were prohibited (14), and the closure of a public place in
Göttingen city and others can be found in Figure 3.
DISCUSSION
The described outbreaks in RCs posed a particular challenge for
both the city of Göttingen, due to high case numbers, as well as
for the residents of the buildings, who were disproportionally
affected by the imposed control measures. These outbreaks
occurred when the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in
Germany was over andmost other districts succeeded in bringing
down case numbers.
The high attack rates of 12 and 22% among residents
of RC1 and RC2, respectively, suggest that, in line with
published evidence (1–3), overcrowding, and within-household
transmission have likely played a significant role in the spread of
the virus. It was assumed by local authorities that in addition to
officially registered residents further not-registered persons lived
in the RCs, in particular in RC2, therefore overcrowding was
likely even more severe. Physical distancing, self-isolation, and
shielding may be difficult to implement in these settings (2, 15,
16). The high genomic sequence similarity of a subset of samples
from outbreak 2 supports the hypothesis that all cases belonged
to the same outbreak and there is no evidence of multiple
introductions. Additionally, this is supported by phylogenetic
analysis that revealed identical virus lineages B.1.159 in all
samples. Despite relatively low overall lineage detection in
Germany in 2020, B.1.159 was detected in only 9 other samples
in Germany. However, the 19 analyzed cases were spread over
the whole RC with at least one sequenced case per level in one
of the four building parts, which supports our hypothesis of
a fast transmission inside the building due to many contacts
among residents.
At the time of the outbreaks, Lower Saxony was preparing
to pass a Housing Protection Act, which allows municipalities
to identify and declare overcrowded, run-down dwellings as
uninhabitable. The act further defines a minimum space of 10 m2
per person. This could help prevent similar outbreaks which are
associated with overcrowding.
The immediate compulsory testing of all residents and the
quarantine of the entire building in outbreak 2 was initiated
in response to the rapid spread of infection and low uptake
of voluntary testing during outbreak 1. While it facilitated
infection control measures, the crowding of people in front
of the test center while waiting may have favored the further
spread of the virus among residents. In the follow-up tests
of those who initially had negative test results, 18 additional
residents tested positive. These cases could be secondary cases.
However, to exclude additional transmission during testing and
quarantine/isolation, time scheduling and measures favoring
physical distancing should therefore be considered when mass
testing is implemented. Distribution of free masks can help to
protect people in corridors and shared spaces.
To reduce the possibility of transmission within overcrowded
buildings, it is recommended that cases, contact persons, and
non-cases within narrow RCs are separated, as well as cases
and negative-tested people within one household (15). The latter
should be decided on a case-by-case basis with the aim to
protect persons with risk of severe infection, and together with
the household members (17). As the example of RC1 shows,
separation can even be self-organized by residents within the
building, if circumstances allow. However, this would not have
been possible in the case of RC2, with much smaller apartments,
lack of space and rooms, and more overcrowding. Therefore,
municipalities should provide extra room for separation, such as
in hostels or hotels.
Screening in workplaces of cases and contacts—as part of
the Göttingen district test strategy—showed that the outbreak
neither affected the two nursing homes where contact persons
were employed, nor the schools of the infected children.
However, even though the city implemented far-reaching
measures in the general population to limit the outbreak,
such as the closure of schools, day care centers, a public
place and team sports (12, 14), overall case numbers in
the whole district increased during the time of outbreak
1 and 2, and some of them were probably additionally
related to the outbreaks. This is supported by the fact
that total COVID-19 case numbers in the whole district
surpassed cases assigned to the outbreaks during the outbreaks’
period by 158 cases, of which 57 cases were assigned to a
separate outbreak in the district, but decreased to very low
levels below 10 reported cases per week after end of June
(Figure 1). Contact tracing may have been hindered due to
language barriers and high case numbers, which may have led
to under-reporting.
Several factors might explain the overall low proportion (45%)
of symptomatic COVID-19 cases in comparison to the national
average of 85%. First, under-reporting of symptoms is likely
due to the short period of time in which the interviews took
place, as well as reported language barriers, particularly in RC2,
where only 11% of the cases reported symptoms. The testing
of all residents led to the identification of asymptomatic and
presymptomatic cases, which was expected. Published data of
different settings reveals that overall 40-45%, but with great
variation and up to 96% of those infected with SARS-CoV-
2 will remain asymptomatic, in particular among the young
(18, 19). The infected population was comparatively young, with
a median age of 23 and 20 years, respectively, and included a
high proportion of cases among children under the age of 18
years. This is due to an overall young resident population in the
two affected RC. We assume that the children played a major
role in the outbreak, by playing together and transmitting the
infection from household to household. Maybe the small elderly
resident population was rather isolated and did not mix up with
the families living in the residential complex, resulting in a lower
AR of 5.9% and even 0 among persons aged 65 and older in RC1
and 2, respectively. The age distribution of residents and cases
also explains the low proportion of hospitalized cases in both
outbreaks of 4.8% compared to the national average of 17% in the
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same period (20). Nevertheless, severe cases requiring intensive
medical care among people under 30 years and one death were
also reported.
An important consideration of the two outbreaks and how
they were handled are the experiences of the residents due to
their social statuses and ethnic and cultural identities. As with
other similar communities, many residents of the buildings may
likely experience marginalization, discrimination, and racism
(21–24). Discrimination and poverty are linked to precarious
housing, living and working conditions; as well as to poor
health conditions, including chronic underlying diseases that
favor severe disease progression (25–32). Reducing the risk of
infection in people living in overcrowded and precarious housing
conditions is therefore important (31, 33). Particular emphasis
should be placed on information about risk factors, identifying
and close follow-up of people at increased risk of severe COVID-
19 disease, and early initiation of inpatient care, if necessary.
Overcrowded housing is a risk for pathogen transmission. Hence,
the prevention of such housing situation has to be a task of
public health.
Mass quarantine in the second outbreak was a substantial
control measure that the city of Göttingen implemented due to
the disproportionately high incidence already ranging between
71.5–89.9/100,000 population after the first outbreak, while the
national incidence had come down to 2.6/100,000 at that time (5).
During outbreak 2, the 7-day incidence in the city of Göttingen
increased even to 123.5/100,000 population.
Residents and civil society organizations initially reacted with
anger and protest to this measure: despite information flyers
in German and Romanian language, and Romanian language
translation, many residents of RC2 felt not well-informed about
the necessity of the implemented measures. Insecurities arose
from lack of information probably due to inappropriate or
insufficient information as well as from the fear of infection inside
the building, since physical distancing and self-isolation were
hardly possible. To reach the entire resident population an even
broader range of modes of information would have been helpful.
Aspects like preferred information ways and lack of knowledge,
distrust of authorities, or misinformation have to be taken
into account. Furthermore, the consequences of an immediate
restriction of movement for people who cannot store food, lack
social support or are dependent on drugs and alcohol can be
essential. The city supplied RC2 residents therefore with food,
sanitary products, and provided OST as well as medical care.
A quarantine may also jeopardize employment relationships,
especially when they are informal. Therefore, quarantine should
only be applied to direct contacts of cases. The local authorities
quickly re-tested all negatively tested non-household contacts
and released those who tested negative from the quarantine that
is usually enacted for 14 days.
Populations that are deemed “marginalized” have been
disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 pandemic
and coercive public health measures (16, 24, 34). Differing
proficiencies in the locally spoken language of affected people
might also play a role. The economical and psychological
consequences and effects of measures vary according to the
socio-economic situation of the people affected (28, 35).
Of note is the higher AR among women in RC2 as compared
to men. We can only speculate reasons for that: women may have
been more exposed to infected, mostly asymptomatic children
in the household. It is crucial to adequately identify the most
vulnerable in the outbreak situation, and to consider specific
needs by involving community members or representative
organizations of the residents, such as NGOs, key people in the
community, language mediators, social workers, and counselors
in the planning and implementation of measures (16, 36–38).
The current COVID-19 pandemic as well as the HIV and Ebola
epidemics have shown that the effectiveness of infection control
measures depends largely on community participation (37–40).
In the case of Göttingen, some requested NGOs refused their
support because they did not want to enter the building or were
not available at short notice. Preventive networking is therefore
essential to be prepared when it comes to an outbreak. An
anti-discriminatory approach, transparent communication, and
information in all needed languages and consideration of actual
needs can facilitate voluntary testing and individual quarantine
and isolation (17).
Lastly, a lesson that was learned also in Göttingen, ethnization
and culturalization of social problems should be avoided because
they reproduce discrimination and prejudices. It is particularly
important to ensure that COVID-19 is not associated with certain
communities (27, 33). Ethnic groups and affiliation to religious
or social communities should only be named if relevant for
outbreak management. In general, public health measures should
be implemented in a just and equitable manner (24).
There are several limitations to our analysis: The presentation
of the time course of the outbreaks was significantly influenced by
the screening activities of the LPHA, and the actual course of the
outbreaks is not known. We may have missed further cases. The
data used for descriptive analyses was derived from the LPHA’s
COVID-19-database as of Jul 3, 2020. Any information that may
have subsequently been added on cases is not included in the
present analysis.
In these outbreaks the determination of the secondary or
tertiary attack rate due to transmission within households or
inside the buildings would have been important, however, this
could not be done since the available data did not provide any
information on whether a person was a primary, secondary, or
tertiary case. The screenings were not done systematically as not
all residents showed up for all screenings. Thus, residents who
were tested positive in the last screening might have already been
infected earlier. Furthermore, information on onset of symptoms
was largely incomplete in the epidemiological dataset so that this
information could also not be used.
Not all officially registered residents of the affected RCs
lived there at the time of the outbreaks, and there might be
residents living in the RCs who were not officially registered.
Inaccuracies are therefore to be expected in the number
and description of the socio-demographics of the residents.
Furthermore, only cumulative information on age and gender
of residents was available for analysis so that further analyses of
cases and residents were not possible. We had no information
on jobs, time spent at home or outside, number of persons
per household neither of the infected nor of the resident
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population, so that further analyses on household level were
not possible.
Finally, a total of 333 cases were assigned to the outbreaks
in the LPHA’s COVID-19 database, but only 287 cases were
assigned to this outbreak in SurvNet. This difference is caused
by incomplete assignment of reported cases to outbreaks in
SurvNet, which may be due to the fact that the Göttingen
LPHA uses different software products: SurvNet is only used to
transmit case reports to the federal and national level, but not as
working software for documentation, which may cause a loss of
important data.
CONCLUSION
In outbreaks involving people who are affected by poverty and
precarious working and living conditions, special sensitivity in
all implemented measures is recommended. Discrimination and
racism should be acknowledged as crucial determinants of health
disparities. The heterogeneity and specific needs of residents
should be taken into account, and language- and culturally-
sensitive information of residents about all measures as well as
a participatory approach are recommended.
The findings of the two outbreaks in Göttingen indicate
that overcrowded housing conditions can promote COVID-
19 outbreaks. Effective public health measures included the
immediate PCR testing of all residents after the occurrence
of initial cases, implementation of hygiene measures in the
buildings, and the general closure of schools and hygiene
measures at local level. Further recommended measures include
the implementation of a legal basis to declare buildings with
cramped housing as uninhabitable to prevent unhealthy living,
and organizing spatial separation possibilities.
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